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AN APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY AND
NATIONAL DISUNITY
NICHOLAS A. SMITH*
The legal system of a society does not exist in splendid isolation,
occupying some quiet ancillary spot apart from the reality of social stress.
The formal object of a legal structure is conflict resolution; and law
which is not concerned with the settlement of disputes might best be given
another name. Since disparate interests are by definition part of complex
society, the efficacy of a legal system in dealing with disruptive social
forces is central to the issue of social survival. Without reference to the
substantive political and ethical questions involved in the waging of the
Vietnam War, some discussion of the effects of war dissent and responses
to dissent on American society can be offered within the frame of general
theory.
It was the belief of Dean Pound that the law serves and is developed
by social interests. The law, said Pound, is "a social institution to satisfy
social wants."' Consistent with this definition, the Dean saw the end
of law as the maximization of the claims, demands, and expectations felt
by men in civilized society. The logical consequence of Pound's approach
is that legal and sociological inquiry cannot be kept sealed in separate
compartments. Not only must the expectations of various social groups
be taken into account, with hopes of bringing them into harmony, but
the necessary level of order and security must be maintained by legally
constituted authority. The paramount social interest, according to Pound,
is the general security. The ordering of human conduct which is essential
to bringing different social groups' interests to fruition must be the prime
concern of the law.
There is implicit in Pound's sociological jurisprudence an ordering
of values-the predominance of the general interests over the interests
of any particular group. The law seeks justice for divergent groups and
individuals according to the principle articulated by Cicero in the phrase
"to each his due."'2 Yet the added dimension of total group interests
* J.D. University of Tennessee, 1969; Member of the North Carolina Bar;
Visiting Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University; Fellow in Anthro-
pology, Duke University.
'ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922).
'A good discussion of the thought of Marcus Tullius Cicero is found in
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must be weighed because, in Bodenheimer's words, "Justice demands that
freedom, equality, and other basic rights be accorded and secured to
human beings to the greatest extent consistent with the common good.
' 3
This general postulate of the primacy of common interests, of course,
is not exclusive to Dean Pound or even to the sociological school of
jurisprudence. It is expressed in the ancient maxim salus populi est
suprema lex-the welfare of the people is the supreme law. The relevant
legal doctrines of natural law, utilitarianism, and almost every other
jurisprudential approach can have much to say about this particular issue.
It is enough for the purpose of the subject being discussed here to indi-
cate that law must often determine what is in fact the common good,
and then balance it against special interests. Both of these judgments
are pertinent, since some theoretical model must exist for arriving at a
definition of common interests and since some guidelines must be sought
in actually choosing between them and the particular interests in ques-
tion. It will not do, for example, to arbitrarily declare that public policy
represents the common good without some stated means of expressing such
policy. Nor would it seem just to place any common interest above any
private one with no regard for qualitative as well as quantitative prop-
erties. We can countenance the condemnation of one man's house to
accomplish the convenience of all other members of the community
through the building of a new highway. It is doubtful that we could
as easily justify under present theory the perpetual physical torture of a
single man if that alone could result in a faster flow of traffic on some
already existing road. In considering the issue of common-versus-special
demands, then, the two problems of definition of interests and weighing
of interests must be taken into account.
This difficult task-evaluating competing social demands and assigning
priorities to them-is not the only one which calls for clarification by
our legal theories today. It is also not the only one arising from the
disputes which domestic disunity presents to our legal system. Another
broad issue which has always confronted legal thinkers, and particularly
has done so in the period since rapid advances in technology have begun to
dramatically influence the conditions of life, is the question of how the
law shall provide for both stability and change in society. Even given
the need for a level of order which is fundamental to the achievement of
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justice in society, there still exists a pressure for social change at any
particular moment in history. The awesome duty of our legal institutions
is not simply to preserve the status quo but to give transitional stability
to society. Needless-to-say, the United States Supreme Court has repeat-
edly faced this dual demand in its epistimological voyage through years
which have seen the nation change drastically from the tiny rural land
of 1787.
It can be seen that the stability which is essential to the realization
of justice cannot be an entirely static condition. To secure for each that
which is his due, and to realize the expectations of civilized men, a legal
system must admit of change through time. Even the doctrine of stare
decisis, for example, does not dictate that we look back as doggedly as
did Lot's wife, becoming like her a pillar of salt. The issue of stability-
change has to be seen in terms of dynamic stability, particularly when
faced with a situation of widespread social disunity. We can perhaps
accept the guidance of some permanent principles in law while at the
same time agreeing with Heraclitus that we can never step in the same
river twice.
Still other dilemmas must be raised before a theoretical approach
to present challenges to jurisprudence found in national dissension can be
formulated. As Edmond Cahn has pointed out,4 the plight of democratic
man is that he cannot escape the responsibility for the acts and policies
of government which participatory democracy imposes on him. The con-
flict of values which is inevitable in a vast and varied country means that
someone or some group is always going to feel pained responsibility for
one national policy or another. The paradox is that by being faithful
to the ideals of our constitutional democracy, one must inexorably dis-
cover himself to be at odds with government policy at some time. One
cannot, it seems, be a permanently agreeable and passive citizen and at
the same time a good democrat. The issue appears to be shaped around
the form which one's dissent should take rather than around its pro-
priety in legal theory. As in the law of conspiracy, legality involves not
only a question as to whether an unlawful act has been committed, but
also a question as to whether a lawful act has been committed in an un-
lawful manner.
It is not contrary to legal theory, then, to be concerned when govern-
mental acts are contrary to one's own order of values or to one's "sense
of injustice," in Cahn's term. Ample precedent exists-in the acts of
' EDMOND CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC MAN (1961).
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Antigone, Sir Thomas More, and countless others-for declaring resis-
tance to constituted authority to be a proper issue for jurisprudential
scrutiny. That the means as well as the end must be legally evaluated
is a truism unnecessary to pursue here. The fact of extant disunity
growing out of both policy disagreement and out of the methods adopted
to express it cannot be denied in any case. It is with the present situa-
tion, the existing disunity, that it is meant for a theoretical approach to
be developed. The existing tensions as they have resulted from the
methods of war protesters can simply be accepted as social facts with
which legal theory and practice must cope.
Connected closely with the idea of citizen responsibility for the acts
of elective officials, but still distinct enough from it to warrant mention
as a separate issue, is the question of the quality of the nation itself as an
entity. Many political theorists, including Thomas Jefferson, who was
both a lawyer and a legislator, have acknowledged that the life of the
state differs in important ways from the life of individuals. The state, for
instance, is not limited by so finite a number of years of lifespan, though
it does have a birth and death. Individual men do to a great extent define
themselves by their acts, but in the case of a state this is vastly much
more determinative of the character of the entity. A state is what it does.
A state can become what it assumes itself to be in its policies. A young
state can act-and be-moribund; a revolutionary state can become
a defender of the status quo; a just democracy can disregard its docu-
mentary origins and obligations to act unjustly. If, then, the individual
citizen is, in a sense, part of what his country does as a result of its being
a participatory democracy, and if his country is defined by what it does,
then he too is defined by his country's policies.
The meaning of this sort of metaphysical-geometric chain is that
individuals feel intensely about their involvement in contests of ordering
values in national policy. Identification with the acts of the nation,
whether in defense of them or disillusionment over them resulting in
shame, introduces a personal element to the conflict over policy which
further makes it a proper subject for legal theory. Hovering over the
entire United States today is an actual case-in-controversy which inti-
mately involves principles of moral and legal equity and which numbers
its parties in millions. If the role of law is indeed to provide stability
and to regulate change, while at the same time contemplating both social
interests in the name of pragmatic social continuity and ultimate ends
in the name of purposive humanity, then this conflict must be addressed.
4
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If the law cannot speak to the searing issues of social disunity of our
time, and specifically to the question of war dissent, then it will not have
done its job.
The dispute over the proper nature of legal education5 indicates that
some sense of uneasiness lies on the legal progression. Law schools have
long envisioned their mission as being the production of practical advocates
equipped to serve clients with real problems. That they have done so
rightly can be stated with some certainty. The choice, after all, is not
really between Pericles and the plumber. Lawyers have a social niche to
fill which requires effective practicality. This does not erase, however,
the fact that lawyers have traditionally been expected to fill other roles
as well. If they have not been called on to be full-time Pericleans, neither
have they been called on to be full-time plumbers. Cicero, More, Coke,
Adams, Hamilton, Jefferson, and many more, were able to render services
to their countries which called for some awareness of issues beyond those
involved in a single client's case. The law has ever been able to extract
great principles transcending particular facts from any and all actual cases.
Law and lawyers are called upon today to exercise principled leadership
in assuring the nation of its present status in the midst of uncertainty
and of its ideological direction as a nation founded on principles of law.
Whether lawyers are prepared for the task or not is immaterial. The
expectation is that they do know more about such things than other
men, and that they can make at least constructive contribution beyond the
emotional reactions which any citizen can add to the clamor. There may
be nothing in a legal education which prepares a man to be a legislator-
what ought the law to be-or even a judge, but lawyers are expected to
be both and more. Which is to say that layman demands of the attorney
that he be oriented towards policy and not simply towards adjudication.
When the policy issues, as those set forth above, are directly related to
the realm of legal theory, no excuse exists for a numbing silence emerging
from the bar. The problem is not so unique as to paralyze lawyers and
reduce them to unexpert noncontributors. Mr. Justice Turledge once
said that the law and freedom are inconsistent in the ultimate and can
destroy each other, but that neither can long endure without the other.
This paradox is the stuff of law and its latest culmination in war dissent
and resultant serious disunity should not short circuit legal minds.
In past times, of course, some stress situations in society have done
Many of the issues relevant to the proper education of lawyers are discussed
in various articles of 54 VA. L. REV. (1968).
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exactly that. Charles Dickens Bleak House is an excellent representation
of the failure of the legal profession in a period of high claims and low
performance. The death of the Lord Chancellor is spoken about as
follows:
The Lord Chancellor of that Court, true to his title in his last
act, has died the death of all Lord Chancellors in all Courts, and of
all authorities in all places under all names soever, where false pre-
tences are made, and where injustice is done. Call the death by any
name Your Highness will, attribute it to whom you will, or say
it might have been prevented how you will, it is the same death
eternally-inborn, inbred, engendered in the corrupt humors of the
viscious body itself, and that only-Spontaneous Combustion, and none
other of all the deaths that can be died.6
Which introduces the additional element which lies beneath the overt
issue of war dissent-a growing disillusionment with society and its
institutions leading to revolutionary temper. Revolutionaries have often
cried "Let's kill the lawyers first !" Whether they have done so more
for the affirmative bad acts of lawyers or for the failure of lawyers to lead
and make contributions in prerevolutionary times of disappointment is a
conjectural question. Nevertheless, we do not need to forecast actual
violent revolution to appreciate that some potential exists for an ultimate
finding that lawyers were called and did not answer-that an ideological
gloom had descended on their state and that they, like Dickens' Lord
Chancellor, sat "in the very heart of the fog." All of England's barristers
were busy "tripping one another up on slippery precedents, groping
knee-deep in technicalities" and staying in a courtroom like a dark well
where you could look in vain for truth at the bottom. It would have been
well for the lawyers of the day to have remembered the Old Testament
admonition that "the letter of the law killeth." One cannot escape the
feeling that if the spirit of the laws is to prevail, the spirit of the lawyers
may need to be envigorated. Perhaps writers of Dickens' talent do not
presently abound, but apparently many do not lack his bitterness. The
heritage of the law admits of room for creative thought and action in time
of social challenge, but it also admits of challenges unmet and bitter
disappointment rampant. This is still another paradox relevant to the
problem here; the law can be both bright promise and hopeless haze.
That alternatives for response to challenge exist is true not only
6 CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1853).
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for the legal profession but also for government. Policy can always be
good or bad, appropriately responsive or not. Some theoretical reference
to the nature of response and to its effect on the nature of the whole prob-
lem is now in order. While above it was briefly mentioned that the life
of the state differs in some vital ways from the lives of individual men,
it must now be added that a great deal can be gained from viewing the
state as a living entity. There exist several important parallels which
can be derived from biology to the benefit of a statement of the problem
faced in America at present. Some of those advantages relate specifically
to the idea of the role of response in determining the character of the
total challenge-response problem.
Dr. Ren6 Dubose of the Rockefeller University has written that
"the severity of a microbial or toxic disease is determined as much by
the intensity of the body response as it is by the characteristics of the
microbe or toxin involved." 7
Likewise, the response to an ideological invasion of the "body politic"
may itself determine in great measure the severity of the struggle. Ex-
cessive or ill-conceived responses will aggravate the situation, even making
a real problem where only an imaginary one was before. In short: the
war dissent itself is not the full extent of the present problem of dis-
unity. It is rather that the existence of dissent together with the responses
to it rendered by government join to create a problem of wider dimension
than simply the advent of unilateral uproar. In politics, it must be a
truism to say that what people think is true can be more important than
what is true, and indeed that what enough people believe to be true
will in fact become operationally true as a social fact. When a challenge
is believed to be of huge and formidable size and the response is geared
to that belief, the challenge does in fact become serious regardless of
whether it was originally or not. This is reflected partly in the military
principle of economy of force, which recognizes that over-reaction can
itself create new problems.
Dr. A. E. Clark-Kennedy wrote about the nature of disease in such
a way as to further aid a conceptual comparison with the ills of the
state.8 Diseases, he said, "are clearly not entities each with an in-
dependent existence." A disease is not a thing which overtakes a man,
rather it is a reaction between the individual body-mind and his environ-
ment. Here again the definitive effect of the reaction must be noted.
"RENt DUBOSE, MAN, MEDICINE, AND ENVIRONMENT 75 (1968).
'A. E. CLARK-KENNEDY, HUMAN DISEASE 228 (1957).
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Rebellion, it would seem, cannot exist by itself in uncomplemented
splendor. Dissent requires policy before it can be brought to life,
since there can be no dispute with a non-existent judgment (-though one
could dispute the absence of action itself, which would still be actively
reacting to some extant fact, and would not qualify as dissent without
basis).
This phenomenon becomes important for the purpose of analyzing legal
theory as related to war dissent when it is realized that the levels of
responsibility to be anticipated on the two sides of the war dispute are
not the same. Youthful demonstrators and dissenters are just that-
youthful. One reason cited by authorities for not taking their advice is
their inexperience and juvenility. It should not be surprising to find un-
sophisticated political behavior on the part of "children"-this point
having no reference to the possible merits of the dissenters' complaints
but being directed purely to method and response. What would be sur-
prising would be for sophisticated and mature policy makers to initiate
responses which did not recognize the role of the response in determining
the scope of the problem, and which therefore might be expected to worsen
the problem rather than solve it.
This dilemma, then, is that "the road to hell can be paved with good
intentions." Put another way, ignorance may not be bliss.
At this point the beginnings of a theoretical approach can be made.
Just as we may tend to think of a disease as an actual entity which is
waiting to attack us, rather than as a complex reaction between an
organism and its environment, we tend to think of legal concepts as
having independent existence. Law deals with abstractions as well as
with reality-the corporation, for example. This very beneficial habit
of making practical use of abstract legal concepts can cause trouble if one
grows to believe that the concepts have concrete and independent ex-
istence, and are therefore not so amenable to change. We cannot alter
the number of eggs in a basket by thinking in terms of a different num-
ber, though we can instantly modify the number of heirs or tenants in
common upon the arrival of another relative on the scene. Thinking
of legal concepts as realities tends to make them less flexible. If we take
the Hegelian position that the state is the highest order of existence on
earth, for example, then the idea of the nation can very quickly become
" Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). See also DAVID LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 285-299
(1964).
8
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dysfunctional and men can exist to serve the state's pleasure. If we take
the Categorical Imperative of Kant, which commands actions to be
such that they could always be universals, and sanctify it as an inviolable
case rule, then bad law will result as soon as a slightly different fact
situation presents the same issue in bare principle. We avoid the latter
result through the use of legal fictions and institutionalized jury fact-
finding, which can disregard the court's instructions when the fact situa-
tion demands individual treatment. We nevertheless do pay some homage
to Kant by claiming universal case rules applied through stare decisis.
The danger persists, though, that we may begin to think of an
abstraction in the service of a principle as a "thing." If this happens
and we "let the tail wag the dog" of law, then conceptual reasoning in
law has become ill-equipped to deal with increasing challenge. If hardened
conceptual thought accepts the idea of a legal situation once "given" as
permanent, and the boundaries of the situation are in fact shifted by
events, then legal thought might as well stay in Dickens' chancery. The
specific application of the need for alert flexibility to the dissent problem
is this: law must be seen as a process rather than a thing if it is to
be able to deal with changing social situations in such a way as to provide
stability and regulate change.
This view of law, of course, is that of Professors Lasswell and Mc-
Dougal at the Yale Law School, and is a part of their "policy science"
approach to jurisprudence. 10 It may be that the views of these two men
can be added to the theories of an anthropologist, Dr. Gregory Bateson,
who visited New Guinea in 1936, and that the resulting statement can
cast some light on America's crisis in dissent.
A brief summary of the pertinent aspects of policy science must now
be undertaken: law must be viewed as a continuing process of authori-
tative decision, rather than as a system of inflexible precedents and rules.
The paramount objective of social policy is the protection of human
dignity. Law is the sum of the formal power decisions in a community,
and should be "goal oriented" rather than entirely determined by
precedent or doctrine. This hardly does justice to Lasswell-McDougal as
a super-brief statement of some of their complex ideas. It seems necessary
here, however, only to refer to the policy aspects of the system-to the
future oriented legal decision which is made with realization of the
" For a summary of the Lasswell-McDougal theory see McDougal, Jurispru-
dence for a Free Society, 1 GA. L. REV. 1 (1966).
9
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effect it will have on the community as its major determinant, and is not
made subservient to a prior case rule in the main.
To McDougal the role of the lawyer is "that of asserting leadership in
the establishment and maintenance of processes of authoritative decision
adequate to secure our preferred public order."'" The critical issue is the
degree of enlightenment about the requirements of common interest which
the lawyer is able to apply in seeking to guide the community through
situations for which our constitutional doctrine provides no automatic
solution-as in the case of disunity from intense anti-war dissent and
reaction to it. If the lawyer cannot get complete understanding from the
past experience of the courts, he would, it seems, be justified in looking
elsewhere for clues. One place that he might look is at the latmul people
of New Guinea.
Professor Batson formulated the theory of "schismogenesis" as a
result of his study of the Iatmul."2 He defined schismogenesis as "a
process of differentiation in the norms of individual behavior resulting
from cumulative interaction between individuals." It is a process in which
each party reacts to the reactions of the other. It may be "symmetrical,"
says Bateson, in which case the reactions are risingly competitive. It
may also be "complementary," in which event the increasing dominance
of one individual or group is reacted to by the other by his becoming more
submissive. An international war, therefore, is by definition a symmetrical
schismogenesis with increasing effort and determination on both sides
resulting as each reacts to the other. Bateson might today have recourse to
the term "escalation" to express the same thought.
Either form of schismogenesis-symmetrical or complementary-can
end in total estrangement of the two groups involved. The distance
between the groups in a schismogenic situation increases as the process
continues. This divergence can be arrested, however, if some con-
trary force balances the repelling forces-as when a man and wife remain
together in mutual hostility because of feelings of responsibility to the
children; or as when the locally feuding members of two clans are sum-
moned by their common king to combat a common outside enemy. If the
schismogenic drift is in fact arrested, the factions may not have returned
to a state of mutual fondness or ever indifference. They may be in a
condition of "dynamic equilibrium," as opposed to static stillness. That
"Id.
12 GREGORY BATESON, NAVEN 175 (2d ed. 1958). See particularly chapter
XIII and the 1958 Epilogue. Bateson's theory of negative feedback in a social
system is also pertinent.
10
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is; there may be schismogenic forces but they are equaled by reciprocating-
forces demanding attraction. It can be argued that the Vietnam War is in
a state of approximate equilibrium as a symmetrical schismogenesis, not
because the Viet Cong and the United States are attracted to each
other, but because of the intrinsic nature of the Communist "war of
liberation." It is the deliberate policy of the Communists to avoid decisive
battle except when sure of victory. The Viet Cong rely on protracted
war lasting for years to demoralize America. The Communists them-
selves have introduced the element of equilibrium, not because they
desire a long term stalemate but because they want to evade short term
defeat. The war is in a state of dynamic equilibrium and will most likely
remain so until the Viet Cong sees an opportunity to break the equilibrium
by attaining victory.
Bateson also theorized that if a schismogenesis between groups is
allowed to proceed to a certain point, the behavior patterns of the mem-
bers of the groups will be altered as they relate to each other. The inter-
group schismogenesis can cause intra-group schismogenesis. It is not
surprising that a protracted Vietnamese War which does not conform
to the American idea of what a war-a schismogenesis-should be, would
cause intra-group strife in America. The distorted war in Vietnam has
created distorted conflicts at home. Because of the nature of the domestic
conflict, in which groups of Americans oppose other groups of Americans,
a new schismogenesis has begun. The domestic, intra-group schismogen-
esis, must be called either symemtrical or complementary. Inasmuch as
the dissenters do not fade away with increased government pressures
against them but instead become more vociferous still, the process must be
called symmetrical, competitive.
The present status of the domestic schismogenesis can in no sense
be called dynamic equilibrium. The continuing war and the continuing
protests against it, as well as the demoralizing effect of the draft on
young people, show no immediately likelihood of cessation.
Two schismogeneses exist-one between the United States and the Viet
Cong and North Vietnam, and the other between factions within the United
States. The former schism is in at least temporarily arrested stages of
leveled hostilities; the latter is not in a state of equilibrium but is in-
creasingly competitive. Given the two schismogenic processes at work,
one in equilibrium and the other still proceeding in lineal directions so
that the groups are becoming still more alienated, some judgment as to
which is more dangerous to America can be made.
11
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Domestic groups can, of course, rival each other and still feel loyalties
-to common ideals or standards which may bring about a state of equilibri-
um. In this respect, it becomes very meaningful that most dissenters
-speak about the "false values" of the older generation, which is to say
,of the policy makers. Once unquestioned values are now criticized if not
,condemned. Commonalities of symbols are difficult to find, much more so
common active loyalties. The contra-divisive forces of attraction which
could bring about equilibrium may exist, but apparently do so at such
basic levels of emotional ties that they may not be evoked until the inertial
tendencies of the schismogenesis have rendered it either irresistable, or
capable of being arrested only at great cost in morale. Toynbee does
assert 3 that the successful response to challenge is a definitive element
in the raising of a society's energy and capacity, whereas failing to
meet a challenge well decreases the same resources.
Every culture which has contained disparate and hostile--overtly or
covertly-elements has not flown apart as the result of snowballing schis-
mogenesis. Society does not always react to reactions in a suicidal whirl
until centripetal force tears the social fabric. Why not?
Of the methods by which schismogenesis can be brought under con-
trol, one of the major ones which could perhaps be applied in the
contemporary situation is for deliberate admixture of the types of
schismogenesis to be created. The squire who owned the village might
play ball with the villagers on one day each year, thereby competing with
them equally in symmetrical schismogenesis whereas he usually related
to them as master to servant in complementary schismogenesis. The same
process applied when the officers of a British ship served mess to the
men on one day. Tension was taken out of the relationship by means of
mixing, temporarily, the forms of schismogenesis.
In many tribal cultures application of the same principle serves to
prevent tribal disintegration. Extremely dominant men allow the women
to dress as men at designated times and take on their dominant de-
meanor. 14 Some African kings have had to obey the institutionalization
of this process in pronounced form-as when the king had to parade
naked before his people on a certain day while they made fun of him, a
custom not unlike the Roman habit of mocking triumphant generals as
"n ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, CHANGE AND HABIT: THE CHALLENGE OF OUR TIME
54-88 (1966).
"Anyone of a number of texts on social anthropology will provide various
examples. The primary source for the purposes of this discussion is Bateson's
study of the Iatmul.
12
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they passed. Even the great Zulu king Shaka, who was known to have
men killed capriciously simply as a device to maintain power by terror,
tolerated the traditional court functionary whose duty it was to follow
the king about shouting out all of his faults in a loud voice. Shaka
apparently realized the value of this institutional admixture of schismo-
genesis forms.
Whether the present American administration shares that aware-
ness seems doubtful. Criticism from the press has come under direct
attack by the Vice President, and even the courts have begun recently to
subpoena unshown television news film. The Attorney General apparently
referred to the Republican Ripon Society as "juvenile delinquents" on
a televised interview. The President has announced that he will not
listen to protesters and that nothing they can do will sway him. It
would appear that the dissenters themselves cannot accomplish any ad-
mixture of schismogenesis in the eyes of the policy makers, and further
that institutional admixtures such as represented by the press and by
Shaka's crier of criticism will be vigorously discouraged. Viewing the
situation in the light of theoretical considerations previously raised, one
cannot help but wonder whether the policy makers are acting dysfunc-
tionally.
A failure to perceive the nature of the domestic conflict seems to
compound the problem. If the administration takes the position that
power conferred by the "silent majority" justifies its attitude of scorn
towards dissenters, it is taking a stand which implicitly recognizes the
conflict as complementary-which states an expectation that the dissent-
ing elements should be quiet and go along with the majority, should
let those who have power employ it. No possible attitude could be
imagined to bring about the worsening of a symmetrical schismogenesis
than to regard one participating group as if it were the passive side
of a complementary schismogenesis.
The hoped for admixture calls for release of tension whereas the
present administrative policy towards dissenters cannot but create tension.
No real disorder need be permitted, any more than the captain of a naval
vessel yielded actual command by serving mess once a year. It cannot
be denied, however, that too much devotion to the shadow of power and
dignity may ironically erode the very substance of both.
It takes a naval captain of some maturity, one imagines, to perform
menial service for his crew without losing his command presence. A
schismogenic situation calls out for leadership which can assert its own
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identity without constant reference to the reactions of others. A leader-
ship policy which requires repeated inquiries-"How am I doing ?"-and
can define itself only in terms of others' reaction to it, is too hollow to
end schismogenesis or to "bring us together." Misreading of the nature
of the conflict will rather create more conflict.
The proper role of the law and of lawyers, then, is not to adopt a
stance of inspiring fear in the hearts of dissenters of certain recrimination
-a policy consistent with Machiavellian political ideals but not with
a jurisprudential realization of the common good. The proper role of
the law is to perceive the actuality of the common good and to seek its
realization within constitutional principles. Andrew Hamilton set a
superlative precedent for American lawyers by defending the idea of a
free and critical press even before the Revolutionary War was fought.
In the still formative stages of the present socially revolutionary feelings
among American youth, lawyers perhaps have an opportunity to act
similarly. A recent national commission of private citizens suggested
that newspaper reporters be subject to government regulation by licensing,
possible a coincidental development, but one which fuels rather than
dampens the furnace of schismogenesis.
The concept of schismogenesis need not be discussed further except
to cite one local example of how its theories have been tested. In Wash-
ington, D. C. peace demonstrators were met by policemen who had
obviously been ordered to be friendly during the Vietnam Mobilization
Day demonstration. Dissenters anticipating hostile police were politely
and even enthusiastically treated. The result was that extremist Weather-
men demonstrators were unable to provoke widespread violence and that
the tone of the entire mass demonstration was markedly cooled. One way
to slow schismogenesis, says Bateson, is to suddenly change the rules
under which it has been progressing.
The jurisprudential issue which requires choosing between the com-
mon good and special causes asks for both a model of the means to dis-
cover the common good and a qualitative calculus which can balance
given common interests against given special interests on some other
basis than quantitative utility. At this point that issue should be fitted into
the theoretical approach advocated here. Philip Wylie discusses the
concept of right-wrong choices in biological terms. 5 He begins his
analysis with the simple tropism, the earliest possible event in the history
"h PHILIP WYLIE, THE MAGIC ANIMAL 58 (1968).
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of life on earth in which affirmative choice of alternatives was presented.
The principle operating then and now, says Wylie, is species continuum.
Not the law of individual self-preservation but the higher law of species
preservation will predominate. If the "body politic" analogy can be
carried further, the survival of the democratic United States is the most
preferable alternative, and that requires value judgment as to what
principles of democracy are essential and must not be lost.
It is not simply the survival of a nation that happens to be in North
America which is dictated but the persistence of the particular species-
democratic republic. Wylie's biological observation, to the effect that
the natural must be the right in choice, can show us that the common
good presumes continuum of definitive common interests, and we can
thus assume that some policy should be sought which would lead to an
end which does not warp the nature of the nation. Schismogenesis must
be stopped, but not at a cost of losing the definitive nature of democracy.
It must not be stopped, that is, by sheer repression. Such an alternative
would not recognize the participatory nature of government and would
strike at not only the means of protest but the idea of protest, as indeed
members of the administration seem already to have done.
The common good is found in survival of the properties of democracy
and not in mere preservation of duly elected authority's policy. Majority
preference is not coeval with the common good concept as a legal idea.
It would seem, therefore, that some values claimed by dissenters should
not be submerged by simply invoking the common good. Those values
include a right to be considered part of the society rather than dis-
regarded as "juvenile delinquents." Human dignity, after all, is a proper
concern of law as defined by Pound, Lasswell-McDougal, and many
others. Social expectations must be considered by law and policy, and law
has not been the Austinian "command of the sovereign" since Nurem-
berg. The paramount social interest of general security calls for stability,
which is a denial of the aims of schismogenesis and which therefore
demands that conciliatory steps consistent with democratic survival
be taken. Only a shallow reading of the mandate for general security
can interpret it as being authority for immediate peace and quiet only.
The paramount social value cannot authorize one to sleep on the railroad
track just because a train has been waved on past-surely the rumbling
vibration of distant wheels can be felt. Can we be certain that all of
those wheels are receding?
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John Adams laid ,doWn a .model forthe, behavior. of attorneys .forIall
time when he defended the. British troops:who were tried for the. Boston
Massacre: Believing in the cause of. the American- Revolution, he, never-
theless extended justice to its. foe.' Principle, and:. the spirit of the law
must precede political.- policy.": One ' cannot 'doubt that *Adams would
have represented the soldiers in question even had he known that doing
so would prevent him from becoming the second president of a yet un-
born nation. He meant to help create not simply a nation, but a just one.
In summary: A proper concern of law is the demands and the expecta-
tions of various social groups, the paramount social interest is the common
good, which may not be equated with majority will but must consider
the continuation of the greater social group as a qualitative entity. The
substratum of order which law must provide needs to be a stability which
allows for change, and which can regulate the direction of the change
rather than merely strive to maintain the status quo. Responses to
challenges are as definitive of the problem as are the challenges them-
selves; the "chicken little" effect of over-response must be evaded, as inust
responses not addressed to the true nature of the challenge.
Legal theory is not alien to political disunity and its concomitant
disputes. The essence of the law demands that it be a creative and guiding
force in such times, and that it adopt a goal-oriented policy stance in
order to preserve the integrity of a nation unique in the history of legal
thought. The mandate of the common good and the general interest must
cancel any idea of "the pleasure of the prince."
When Sir Henry Sumner Maine spoke of the idea of "Equity" in
the last century, he referred to the "superior sanctity" of those principles
by which law is "adopted to social wants."16 A society which begins to
lose its shared ideals of equity, said Maine, will lose cohesion as well.
This puts still another way the basic issue: What results when a social
group states, "We demand!" and authority responds, "We will not
listen!" Entirely aside from the substantive policy issues, a problem of
procedural policy has sprung full-grown into life. Schismogenesis has
begun.
Professor Lon L. Fuller has written recently, I7 that the "central in-
disputable principle" of natural law is the injunction to "Open up, main-
"Sir Henry Sumner Maine, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE
EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 27 (1963).
IT LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 186 (1964).
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tain, and preserve the integrity of the channels of communication by which
men convey to one another what they perceive, feel, and desire."
The traditional concern of legal theory with the integrity of the
social group goes on. What St. Thomas Acquinas called the civilis
conversatio remains an essential area of legal thought.
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